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Abstract—This paper studies the provision of a wireless net-
work by a monopolistic provider who may be either benevolent
(seeking to maximize social welfare) or selfish (seeking to maxi-
mize provider profit). The paper addresses questions that do not
seem to have been studied before in the engineering literature
on wireless networks: Under what circumstances is it feasible for
a provider, either benevolent or selfish, to operate a network in
such a way as to cover costs? How is the optimal behavior of
a benevolent provider different from the optimal behavior of a
selfish provider? And, most importantly, how does the medium
access control (MAC) technology influence the answers to these
questions? To address these questions, we build a general model,
and provide analysis and simulations for simplified but typical
scenarios; the focus in these scenarios is on the contrast between
the outcomes obtained under carrier-sensing multiple access
(CSMA) and outcomes obtained under time-division multiple
access (TDMA). Simulation results demonstrate that differences
in MAC technology can have a significant effect on social welfare,
on provider profit, and even on the (financial) feasibility of a
wireless network.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much recent debate about the deployment of
wireless networks that would allow Internet access in public
areas. Central to this debate is the tradeoff between costs
and benefits. Surprisingly, this debate seems to have ignored
that the costs and benefits of such wireless networks depend
crucially on the technology that is or could be employed.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for
exploring the influence of technology on the costs and benefits
of wireless networks and to demonstrate in a simple scenario
that the feasibility and profitability of such a network may
depend on the technology chosen.
Although we are most interested in the analysis of public
wireless networks, we construct a framework general enough
to allow for the analysis of private wireless networks as well.
Here, we identify a network as being public if the operator is
benevolent, and seeks to maximize social welfare; we identify
a network as being private if the operator is selfish, and
seeks to maximize profit. We show that the analysis of both
public and private wireless networks depends crucially on the
technology layer, the application layer, and the economic layer,
and most crucially of all, on the interactions between these
layers. Indeed, even a proper description of the environment
depends on the interaction between these layers.
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To see why the analysis depends crucially on the inter-
actions between the various layers, consider a simple but
representative scenario. There are two classes of (potential)
users: email users, who are insensitive to throughput and
delay, and video users, who are sensitive to both throughput
and delay. In managing the network, the service provider
can offer a pricing policy, but the service provider’s range
of choices depends on the technology – in particular, on the
medium access control (MAC) protocol – employed. If time-
division multiple access (TDMA) is employed, the service
provider will be able to guarantee the data rate and delay
experienced by the users, and thus charge the users according
to the guaranteed data rates. If carrier-sensing multiple access
(CSMA) is employed, the service provider will be unable to
guarantee the data rate or delay. Absent such performance
guarantees, users may be unwilling to pay for the data rates.
As we will show, there are large regions within the range of
plausible parameters in which employing TDMA rather than
CSMA makes possible large improvements in social welfare.
Indeed, there are regions in which employing TDMA would
be consistent with operating a self-financing network while
employing CSMA would not be.
A. Related Work
Two substantial bodies of work in the engineering literature
ask about optimal behavior of the provider of a wireless
network. The first considers a benevolent provider whose
objective is to maximize social welfare [2]– [7]; the second
considers a selfish provider whose objective is to maximize
profit [8]– [17]. While the works in [2]– [14] study the
optimal pricing policies and resource allocation strategies of
the provider, more recent works [15]– [17] also consider the
technology selection problem faced by the provider. Our work
is unique in that we focus on the comparison between the
optimal behavior of the benevolent provider and the selfish
provider in terms of their pricing policies, and perhaps more
importantly, the impact of the technology on the optimal
behavior of the benevolent and selfish providers.1
Apart from the focus of the paper, our work differs from
existing works in three key elements of the system model.
First, we model prices as real prices actually paid by users
and collected by the service providers. However, the prices
in some works [2]– [10] are not real prices actually paid by
the users; rather, they are control signals used for the purpose
of controlling the network congestion. Palomar and Chiang
1The interplay of technology and pricing policies is discussed by Lehr et al.
[1], but their paper provides no mathematical model or quantitative analysis.
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2[2] and Kelly et al. [3] [4] consider a network with one
service provider serving multiple users and propose charging
in proportion to the flow rates of the users in order to
maximize social utility. Johari and Tsitsiklis [6] [7] focus on
the efficiency loss under this pricing scheme and a variant with
price differentiation. Gibbens and Kelly [5] propose a packet-
based pricing policy for more effective flow control. Under
the same scenario, Basar et al. [8] [9] [10] propose linear and
nonlinear differentiated pricing schemes to control the network
usage and maximize the provider’s revenue.
Second, we model the users as non-atomic strategic players,
who decide whether to enter the network or which pricing plan
to choose based on their utility functions. The price influences
the users’ decisions, which in turn impact the aggregate arrival
rate, i.e. the user demand. However, some works [11]– [17] use
a continuum user model with atomic users that is abstracted
by a single parameter, the user demand, which is simply
determined as a function of the price (and maybe the conges-
tion). Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis [11] studies a dynamic network
with users arriving and leaving the network and derives the
optimal pricing strategy and its static approximation. Similarly,
Starobinski et al. [12] [13] studies optimal pricing strategies
in dynamic spectrum access networks.
Third, since we focus on the influence of MAC protocols
in a Wireless LAN on the optimal behavior of the providers,
we model the technology layer closely as the MAC layer in
wireless networks. We derive analytical expressions for the
data rates achieved by MAC protocols in our model, in order
to determine the utility of the users and their payment based
on the pricing policies. In addition, the congestion experienced
by the users is more accurately modeled as experienced in a
wireless network using the considered MAC protocols. On the
contrary, most works in [2]– [17] consider resource allocation
in higher layers (e.g. flow-level resource allocation [2]– [10]
[14]) or model the technology as a function that determines
the congestion based on the demand [15]– [17].
Other papers use much different models and have a much
different focus. For example, Friedman and Parkes [18] study
the existence of implementable mechanisms for the users to
truthfully announce their arrivals in WiFi networks. Musacchio
and Walrand [19] model WiFi pricing as a dynamic game
involving one access point and one user, and study the Nash
equilibrium (NE) of this game. We do not discuss all of them
due to space limit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the system model for the three-layer
network. In Section III, we formulate the design problem for
the benevolent and selfish providers and the decision process
of the users as a two-stage game (with the provider acting
in the first stage and the users acting in the second stage). In
Section IV, we focus our analysis on a typical scenario to gain
insights into this problem, and provide simulation results in
this typical scenario. Finally, Section V states our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a public wireless network, created by a service
provider to enable Internet connections to potential users in
public areas such as parks, libraries, and coffee shops. We
focus on a wireless local area network (LAN) with a single
access point (AP). The model also applies to wireless LANs
with multiple APs to cover a larger area, as long as the
APs are operated by the same service provider and share the
same spectrum. Keeping in mind that a wireless LAN will
typically serve a relatively small number of potential users
who may come and go at any moment in time, we build a
dynamic continuous-time framework in which a finite number
of potential users arrive and depart randomly.
In our framework, the system consists of three layers,
namely the technology layer, the application layer, and the
economic layer. The technology layer includes the MAC
protocol and the admission control policy chosen by the ser-
vice provider; the application layer includes the users’ utility
functions, arrival rates, and service times; and the economic
layer includes the pricing plan offered by the service provider
and chosen by the users. The usual way to describe a system
model is to describe separately and in turn each of the layers.
However, in our settings, it is not possible to describe these
layers separately because they are interconnected. Instead,
we describe the system by the specifications for the service
provider and users. In this way, we can better illustrate the
interactions among the components in the system and the
behaviors of the service provider and users.
Before we begin with the description of the service provider,
we first introduce the basic concept of the user type. The users
are categorized into K types according to their utility functions
and arrival and departure processes. There are Nk identical
users of type k.
A. The Service Provider
The service provider must choose a MAC protocol, a pricing
policy, and an admission control policy. (Here we view the
MAC protocol as a design choice of the provider. However,
our analysis shows that, even if the MAC protocol is not a
design choice, the MAC protocol that is used has an important
impact on the remainder of the design and performance and
in particular on the feasibility of providing service.) However,
before describing these three design parameters, we must note
an important caveat. A MAC protocol describes which packets
of current users will have access to which resources in which
way; an admission control policy describes which users will
be admitted to the system. It would seem that a MAC protocol
should allocate resources to packets of current users (or type
of users), as a function of the current number of users of each
type in the system, and that an admission policy should specify
whether or not an incoming user of a particular type should be
admitted to the system, as a function of the current number of
users of each type in the system. However, the service provider
can only use policies that depend on observable characteristics
and actions of the users and the type of a user cannot be
observed by the service provider.2 In our framework, the
2Leaving aside the point that users might lie about their types in order to
obtain more favorable treatment, it might simply be the case that there are
more types of users than there are pricing plans, so that different types of
users necessarily choose the same pricing plan.
3relevant observable actions of the users are their choices of
pricing plans, so the policies of the service provider should be
specified as functions of the choices of pricing plans.
1) The Medium Access Control Protocol: The MAC pro-
tocol chosen determines the ways in which users may share
the channel resources. In principle, the service provider might
be able to choose among many MAC protocols. CSMA and
TDMA are the canonical MAC protocols. CSMA is represen-
tative of the protocols without a central controller, where the
packets contend to get access to the medium. The widely-
used IEEE 802.11 standards use CSMA as the basic MAC
protocol [20]. TDMA is representative of the protocols with
a central controller, where the packets access the medium in
non-overlapping periods of time. The IEEE 802.11e standard
enables contention-free access control in the Hybrid Control
Function (HCF), which can be considered as a generalized
TDMA protocol [21]. The key difference between CSMA and
TDMA is that TDMA enables the provider to offer quality of
service (QoS) guarantee, while CSMA does not. Specifically,
the users can guarantee to achieve a certain data rate in
TDMA, while their data rates may vary greatly because of the
probabilistic channel access in CSMA. Hence, it is impossible
to charge the users based on their guaranteed data rates in
CSMA. On the contrary, a provider using TDMA can charge
users based on their guaranteed data rates. We write θ for a
particular protocol.
2) Pricing plans, Pricing Policies, and Pricing States: A
pricing plan is a schedule of charges to (potential) users.
For simplicity, we assume that charges consist only of a
subscription fee (paid once per billing period) ps and a
charge q per unit for the guaranteed data rate.3 Of course,
the subscription fee or the charge for the guaranteed data rate
might be 0. Thus a pricing plan is
p = (ps, q), ps ≥ 0, q ≥ 0.
Note that the charge for the guaranteed data rate is applied to
the data rate allocated to a user, instead of the user’s actual
amount of data usage, in a billing period. This is reasonable
because the user should pay for the bandwidth exclusively
allocated to its data, even though it does not use the bandwidth
all the time. In CSMA, the bandwidth is not exclusively
allocated to a certain user. Instead, the users access the channel
opportunistically and may get extremely high or low effective
bandwidth. We take account of this by distinguishing the set
Pθ of pricing plans that can be employed given the MAC
protocol θ.
To allow for the possibility that some users choose not to
belong to the network at all, we will require that the service
provider always offer a dummy plan φ. A user choosing φ
does not subscribe to the network.
A pricing policy is a vector of pricing plans; for simplicity,
we assume here that each pricing policy is a vector of exactly
L + 1 pricing plans: Pθ = (p0,p1, . . . ,pL); by convention
3There would be no difficulty in allowing connection fees, fees that depend
on minutes of usage, fees that depend on time of day, etc. We focus here on
a simpler model to make our essential points.
: Video user
What is the optimal plan?
: Data user
Subscribers 
to plan 1
Subscribers 
to plan 2
Incoming 
users
Non-subscribers
The pricing policy
1. Plan 1: flat fee
2. Plan 2: usage-based fee
Fig. 1. Illustration of the system: first, the service provider announces the
pricing policy and the users of each type choose the optimal probability
distribution over the pricing plans; then, each user randomizes according to
the probability distribution, and subscribes to a particular plan (or leaves the
network).
we assume that p0 = φ. Write
PL+1θ = {φ} × Pθ × . . .× Pθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
L times
for the set of all possible pricing policies given the MAC
control protocol θ.
Given a pricing policy P = (p0,p1, . . . ,pL), each user
type k chooses a pricing plan from P by randomizing over all
the choices according to a probability distribution. We define
the pricing state to be the vector v = (v0, v1, . . . , vL), where
v` is the number of users who are currently online and choose
the pricing plan p`. We write V for the set of pricing states.
3) The Admission Control Policy: The admission control
policy determines whether a user of a given type should be
admitted into the system given the current number of users
of each type in the system. However, as we have noted, the
service provider cannot observe the types of the current users
or of the incoming user, but only the pricing plans they choose,
so the admission control policy must depend only on the
pricing plans chosen by current users – that is, on what we
have called the pricing state – and on the pricing plan chosen
by the incoming user. Hence, an admission control policy is a
function
α : V × {0, 1, . . . , L} → {0, 1},
where we interpret 1 to mean ’admit’ and 0 to mean ’do not
admit’.
The simplest admission control policy admits every poten-
tial user: α(v, `) ≡ 1 for all `. A slightly more complicated
admission control policy sets bounds Nˆ` for each ` = 1, . . . , L
and admits a potential user who chooses the pricing plan `
if and only if doing so does not cause the total number of
current users who have chosen plan ` to exceed the the upper
bound Nˆ`: α(v, `) = 1 if and only if v` ≤ Nˆ` − 1. The
upper bound Nˆ` can be determined according to the total
bandwidth available and the bandwidths allocated to the users
with different pricing plans.
4B. Users
The users are characterized by their utility functions, arrival
processes, and service times. Given user characteristics and
the technology and the pricing policy adopted by the service
provider, each user determines a probability distribution on
the choices of pricing plans that maximizes its expected utility
(which will depend on the choices of all the other users). At the
beginning of time, each user chooses a pricing plan randomly
according to the prescribed probability distribution, and sticks
to the chosen plan throughout the considered time horizon.
Every time a user arrives at the network, the service provider
observes the pricing plan chosen by this user. The service
provider will make the admission control and medium access
control according to the current pricing state and the choice of
a particular user. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of an example
system with two types of users.
1) Choices of Pricing Plans: Users choose pricing plans
to maximize their expected utility, given the menu of pricing
plans, the MAC protocol and the admission control policy of
the provider, and the choices of other users. We allow for
the possibility that users randomize to choose a pricing plan
at the beginning of time. We write pik,` for the probability
that a user of type k chooses plan `; in particular, pik,0 is
the probability of choosing the dummy plan 0. For each k,
we have
∑L
`=0 pik,` = 1. Write pik = [pik,0, . . . , pik,L] for the
(random) action of type-k users, pi = (pi1, . . . , piK) for the
action profile of all the users, and pi−k for the action profile of
users of types other than k. Allowing for randomization guar-
antees that equilibrium exists. We may interpret randomization
literally: users who are indifferent over various plans break
their indifference in a random way. Alternatively, we may
interpret randomization simply as uncertainty in the minds of
the provider and other users. If the number of users is large,
we can also interpret the probability distribution over pricing
plans as the distributions of plans among the population [22].
The randomization is realized at the beginning of time.
Represent the result of the randomization by a set of vectors
n = (n1, . . . ,nK) = ([n1,0, . . . , n1,L], . . . , [nK,0, . . . , nK,L])
with nk,` being the number of type-k users choosing plan `.
2) System State: The system state, or the true state, is de-
fined as the number of online users of each type choosing each
pricing plan. Specifically, the system state x is a K× (L+ 1)
matrix, with xk,l as the element at the kth row and (l + 1)th
column, representing the number of type-k users who choose
plan l and are currently in the network. The system state x is in
Xα(n), the set of admissible system states under the admission
control policy α and the result of the randomization n.
The system state depends on arrivals and departures of users
and on the admission control policy of the service provider,
and thus is random. We write X(t) for the stochastic process
of system state evolution. We assume that the type of a user
is a private characteristic, known to the user but generally
unobservable by other users and the service provider. As a
result, the system state cannot be observed by anyone in the
system.
3) Arrival Process and Service Time: For simplicity, we
assume the arrival process and service time are exogenously
given but not choice variables.4 We use a continuous-time
model (reflecting the fact that users might arrive/depart at
any moment); as in [23], we assume that the users arrive
independently and the arrival process of type-k users choosing
plan ` is Poisson with arrival rate
λk,`(t) = λk · (nk,` − xk,`(t)),
where λk is the individual arrival rate of a type-k user. Note
that the aggregate arrival rate λk,`(t) is proportional to the
number of users currently outside the network (nk,`−xk,`(t)).
We assume that the service time of one type-k user is
exponentially distributed with mean 1/µk, and that different
users leave the network independently. Hence, the aggregate
departure rate of type-k users choosing plan ` is
µk,`(t) = µk · xk,`(t).
Note that our results, based on the analysis of the steady state,
hold true for other probability distributions of the arrival and
departure processes.
4) Billing Period: We fix a billing period of length ∆T ,
which is typically one month. Subscription fees are charged at
the beginning of each billing period; other fees are charged at
the end of each billing period. This is consistent with the usual
billing methods: people pay a subscription fee prospectively
and other charges retrospectively. For convenience, we assume
that neither the provider nor the users discount utility and cost
over the billing period.
5) Expected Utility: The service provider and the users
evaluate the social welfare and their satisfaction, respectively,
by the expected utility, defined as the expectation of the total
utility over a billing period when the stochastic process of the
system state X(t) reaches the steady state. Each user’s total
utility consists of two components: utility of use and disutility
of cost. To keep the model simple, we assume that total utility
is simply the sum of utility of use and disutility of cost and
is linear in cost with marginal utility of cost equal to 1 [24]:
total utility = utility of use − cost . (1)
We denote the expected utility of use of a type-k user
by Uk(θ, α, pi), if the MAC protocol is θ, the admission
control policy is α, and the joint probability distribution over
pricing plans is pi. We can calculate the expected utility of use
Uk(θ, α, pi) as follows
Uk(θ, α, pi) =
L∑
`=1
pik,` ·
∑
n:nk,`≥1
Pr(n|k, `) · V `k (θ, α,n), (2)
where Pr(n|k, `) is the conditional probability that the ran-
domization results in n given that one type-k user chooses plan
` after randomization, and V `k (θ, α,n) is the steady-state utility
of use of a type-k user, if the MAC protocol is θ, the admission
control policy is α, and the realization of the randomization
is n.
4Here, the arrival process characterizes the arrival of users, but not the
arrival of users’ packets. Similarly, the service time is the duration of users
staying in the system.
5V `k (θ, α,n) = lim
m→∞
∫ (m+1)∆T
m∆T
∑
x∈Xα(n)
Pr(X(t) = x) · xk,`
nk,`
· uk(τθk,`(x), δθk,`(x)) · dt
= ∆T · lim
t→∞
∑
x∈Xα(n)
Pr(X(t) = x) · xk,`
nk,`
· uk(τθk,`(x), δθk,`(x)) (3)
= ∆T ·
∑
x∈Xα(n)
Pr(X(∞) = x) · xk,`
nk,`
· uk(τθk,`(x), δθk,`(x)),
+1
The steady-state utility of use V `k (θ, α,n) given n is shown
in (3) at the top of the page, where Pr(X(t) = x) is the
probability that the current system state X(t) is x, uk is the
instantaneous utility of use of a type-k user, and τθk,`(x) and
δθk,`(x) are the throughput and delay of a type-k user choosing
plan `, respectively, if the user is online, the MAC protocol is
θ, and the system state is x. Since there are a finite number of
reversible system states, the steady state of the process X(t)
and thus the limit in (3) always exist. The system state at the
steady state is a random variable X(∞), and its distribution
Pr(X(∞) = x) can be calculated analytically as
Pr(X(∞) = x) = Pr(X(∞) = 0) ·
K∏
k=1
L∏
`=0
xk,`∏
j=1
λk · (nk,` − j)
µk · j ,
where Pr(X(∞) = 0) is the probability of system state
0 ∈ RK×(L+1), in which no user is in the system, and is
determined by
∑
x∈Xα(n) Pr(X(∞) = x) = 1.
We denote the expected cost of a type-k user by
Ck(θ, α,P, pi), if the MAC protocol is θ, the admission
control policy is α, the pricing policy is P, and the joint
probability distribution over pricing plans is pi. The expected
cost Ck(θ, α,P, pi) can be calculated by
L∑
`=1
pik,`
p`s + ∑
n:nk,`≥1
Pr(n|k, `) · q` ·B`k(θ, α,n)
 , (3)
where B`k(θ, α,n) is the expected amount of data rates guar-
anteed for a type-k user choosing plan ` over a billing period
at the steady state, shown as below
B`k(θ, α,n)
= lim
m→∞
∫ (m+1)∆T
m∆T
∑
x∈Xα(n)
Pr(X(t) = x) · xk,`
nk,`
· τθk,`(x) · dt
= ∆T ·
∑
x∈Xα(n)
Pr(X(∞) = x) · xk,`
nk,`
· τθk,`(x). (4)
According to our definition, the expected utility is the
expected utility of use minus the expected cost
Uk(θ, α, pi)− Ck(θ, α,P, pi).
6) Users’ Decision Process: Each user determines the ran-
domizing probability that maximizes its own expected utility
given the other users’ actions. Consider the decision process of
a particular type-k user. For convenience, we write (pi;pi′k) for
the action profile in which the considered type-k user chooses
pi′k, the other type-k users choose pik, and the users of types
other than k choose pi−k. When having (pi;pi′k), instead of
pi, as a variable, Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi′k)) and Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi
′
k))
denote the utility of use and cost of the considered type-k
user, respectively. Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi′k)) can be calculated by
L∑
`=1
pi′k,` ·
∑
n:nk,`≥1
Pr(n|k, `) · V `k (θ, α,n), (5)
and Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi′k)) can be calculated by
L∑
`=1
pi′k,`
p`s + ∑
n:nk,`≥1
Pr(n|k, `) · q` ·B`k(θ, α,n)
 . (6)
Note that when pi′k = pik, we have Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi
′
k)) =
Uk(θ, α, pi) and Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi′k)) = Ck(θ, α,P, pi). Since
each user maximizes their own expected utility given the
others’ decisions, we model the user interaction as the plan
selection game defined as
GP =
{{1, . . . ,K}, {pik}Kk=1, {Uk − Ck}Kk=1} .
Here we put P in the subscript of G to emphasize that the plan
selection game depends on the pricing policy of the provider.
The outcome of the users’ decision process is naturally
the Nash equilibrium of the plan selection game defined as
follows.
Definition 1: pi is a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of the
game GP if for all k,
pik ∈ arg max
pi′k
{Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi′k))− Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi′k))} , (7)
Since we use pik for the action of all the type-k users, the NE
defined above is a symmetric NE.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the interaction between the
service provider and the users as a Stackelberg game. The
service provider chooses a MAC protocol, a pricing policy, and
an admission control policy, foreseeing Nash equilibria of the
plan selection game played by the users. The design problem
of the service provider is therefore to find a MAC protocol θ,
a pricing policy P, and an admission control policy α, so that
at an equilibrium of the plan selection game GP, the social
welfare (for the benevolent provider) or the total revenue (for
the selfish provider) is maximized, subject to the constraint
that costs be covered.
Note that our notion of solution assumes that the service
provider knows the arrival rates, service times, and utility
6functions of all types of users (but does not know the type
of a particular user), and foresees the behavior of the users.
The users in turn must also know the behavior of other users.
Implicitly, therefore, we view the outcome as involving some
learning process that is not modeled here. We intend to address
this issue in later work, while focusing on characterizing the
system performance at the equilibria in this paper.
Under the above assumptions, we can formulate the design
problem of the service provider as follows. For a benevolent
service provider aiming at maximizing the social welfare, its
design problem can be written as
max
θ,P,α
S(θ, α,P, pi) ,
K∑
k=1
(Uk(θ, α, pi)− Ck(θ, α,P, pi)) ·Nk
s.t. pi is a NE of the plan selection game GP,
K∑
k=1
Ck(θ, α,P, pi) ·Nk ≥ C0 · 1{∃k:pik,0<1}, (8)
where S(θ, α,P, pi) is the social welfare defined as the sum
utility of all the users, C0 is the fixed cost for the service
provider during a billing period due to the maintenance of the
network, and 1{A} is the indicator function of the event A.
The second constraint is the individual rationality constraint
for the service provider, which says that the provider needs a
revenue large enough to cover the cost of running the network.
However, if all the users choose the dummy plan, i.e. pik,0 = 1
for all k, the network does not operate, the provider has
no cost and revenue, and the social welfare will be 0. The
solution P∗ to the above problem provides the users with
a set of pricing plans to choose from. Note that for all the
optimization problems in this paper, the optimal solution is ∅
and the optimal value is −∞ if the problem is infeasible.
Similarly, for a selfish service provider aiming at maximiz-
ing its own revenue, its design problem can be written as
max
θ,P,α
R(θ, α,P, pi) ,
K∑
k=1
Ck(θ, α,P, pi) ·Nk
s.t. pi is a NE of the plan selection game GP,
R(θ, α,P, pi) ≥ C0 · 1{∃k:pik,0<1}, (9)
where R(θ, α,P, pi) is the revenue defined as the total payment
of all the users.
Because our focus is the influence of technology on the
economic layer and system performance, we will first solve the
design problems of the providers with a fixed MAC protocol
and admission control policy, and then compare the optimal
pricing policies and the resulting system performance under
different MAC protocols and admission control policies.
Even for a fixed technology, the general design problem
for the service provider may not be easy to solve because
the provider must, in principle, foresee the Nash equilibrium
behavior of users in the plan selection game following all
possible pricing policies and must take into account that such
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
−25
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
Normalized throughput
In
st
an
ta
ne
ou
s 
ut
ilit
y 
of
 u
se
 
 
Video users
Email users
Fig. 2. Example instantaneous utility of use for the video and email users.
For video users, we have α1 = 10, β1 = 0.3. For email users, we have
α2 = 5, β2 = 0.1. The normalized throughput is calculated in CSMA with
the number of users ranging from 20 to 1. The parameters in the CSMA
protocol are chosen such that the throughput is the same as that of a slotted
ALOHA protocol with channel access probability 2/17.
Nash equilibrium might not be unique.5 As we shall see,
however, the design problem is tractable in some settings that
provide useful insights.
Before moving to the detailed analysis, we first guarantee
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the general settings.
Proposition 1: In the plan selection game GP, there always
exists a Nash equilibrium as defined in Definition 1.
Proof: The plan selection game GP is a finite game;
Nash shows that such a game has a Nash equilibrium [25,
Theorem 1]. Moreover, since the users of the same type
are symmetric, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
which the users of the same type choose the same action [25,
Theorem 2].
IV. DETAILED ANALYSIS ON TWO TYPICAL SCENARIOS
In this section, we study two typical scenarios. In both
scenarios, there are two types of users: type-1 users are video
users with stringent throughput and delay requirements, while
type-2 users are email users, who require low throughput and
can tolerate large delay. We assume that the instantaneous
utility of type-k users is a concave function of the form
uk(τ) = αk − βkτ , where τ is the throughput. αk > 0
represents the highest instantaneous utility a type-k user can
get, and βk reflects the rate of increase of utility with respect
to the throughput. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. Although not
essential for the analysis, the following two assumptions are
made. We first assume α1 > α2 to reflect the fact that video
users can get higher utility if the throughput is large. We also
assume β1/α1 > β2/α2, because video users need a higher
throughput to get positive utility. Note that the delay is not
included in the utility function for simplicity, because higher
5In the cases of multiple equilibria, it is not difficult to construct an incentive
scheme that implements a desired action profile in Nash equilibria. Please see
Appendix A of Chapter 23 in [24] for details. For simplicity, here we assume
that the provider can choose the best Nash equilibrium with respect to its
objective function.
7throughput comes with lower delay in the CSMA and TDMA
protocols considered in our paper. Thus, the user preference
can be characterized by a utility function dependent solely on
the throughput.
In the first scenario, the service provider uses CSMA, cannot
guarantee the data rate of a specific user, and can only offer
a pricing plan with a subscription fee alone. In the second
scenario, the service provider uses TDMA, can guarantee the
data rate of each user, and can offer a plan with a subscription
fee and a charge proportional to the date rate. We characterize
the system performance at the equilibria in both scenarios. Our
focus is on understanding how the equilibrium and network
performance are affected by the service provider’s objective
and the technology adopted.
A. CSMA
The provider using CSMA offers the dummy pricing plan
p0 = φ and a single non-dummy pricing plan6 p1 = (ps, 0).
The design problem of the provider can be analyzed using
backward induction. In the plan selection game, there are
nine types of Nash equilibria depending on the value of pik,1:
pik,1 = 0, pik,1 = 1, or pik,1 ∈ (0, 1). The benevolent (selfish)
provider compares the social welfare (revenue) achievable at
all the possible equilibria and adopts the pricing policy that
induces the NE with the highest social welfare (revenue).
To distinguish user behavior in different types of NE,
we use the superscript (t1, t2) to denote the type of NE,
where tk = i, o,m (k = 1, 2) corresponds to the case of
pik,1 = 1 (type-k users are all ‘in’ the network), the case
of pik,1 = 0 (they are all ‘out’ of the network), and the
case of pik,1 ∈ (0, 1) (they are ‘mixed’), respectively. For
example, pi(i,m) denotes the action profile in which type-
1 users are in (pi1,1 = 1) and type-2 users are mixed
(pi2,1 ∈ (0, 1)). For the benevolent provider, we write pis,(t1,t2)
for the NE of type (t1, t2) that maximizes the social wel-
fare, Ps,(t1,t2) for the pricing policy that induces pis,(t1,t2),
and S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) (R(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)))
for the corresponding social welfare (revenue). We use the
superscript ‘r’, instead of ‘s’, for the counterparts in the case
of the selfish provider, e.g., we write pir,(t1,t2) for the NE of
type (t1, t2) that maximizes the revenue.
For the benevolent provider, the type of the optimal NE is
determined by
(ts1, t
s
2) = arg max
(t1,t2)
S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)). (10)
Similarly, the type of the optimal NE for the selfish provider
is determined by
(tr1, t
r
2) = arg max
(t1,t2)
R(θ, α,Pr,(t1,t2), pir,(t1,t2)). (11)
Hence, the provider needs to determine
S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) or R(θ, α,Pr,(t1,t2), pir,(t1,t2))
for each type (t1, t2). In the following, we will show
how the benevolent or selfish provider determines
6There is no need to offer more than one non-dummy pricing plans,
because the users always prefer the non-dummy pricing plan with the lowest
subscription fee.
S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) or R(θ, α,Pr,(t1,t2), pir,(t1,t2))
for each type of NE. For convenience, we define
xk(pik,1) = pik,1 · λ1λ1+µ1
p
1−p + 1 for k = 1, 2, where p
is the transmission probability in the CSMA protocol.
Before we discuss how to solve the design problem, we
derive the analytical expressions of the expected utility of the
users as follows.
Lemma 1: Suppose that the service provider uses θ =
CSMA with transmission probability p, has no admission
control (α ≡ 1), and offers the pricing policy P =(
p0 = φ,p1 = (ps, 0)
)
. When the other users choose actions
according to the action profile pi, the expected utility of use
and expected cost of a type-k user, whose action is pi′k, are
Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi
′
k)) = pi
′
k,1 ·∆T ·
λk
λk + µk
· (12)[
αk − βk
p
(xk(pik,1))
Nk−1 (x−k(pi−k,1))
N−k
]
and Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi′k)) = pi
′
k,1 · ps.
Proof: See [26, Appendix A].
1) Procedures to solve the design problems under CSMA:
Now we show how the providers solve the design problem.
Suppose that the service provider uses θ = CSMA with
transmission probability p, has no admission control (α ≡ 1),
and offers the pricing policy P = (φ, (ps, 0)). To maxi-
mize the social welfare, the benevolent provider follows the
procedure shown in Table I. It compares the social welfare
achievable at six types of NE, and then chooses the opti-
mal NE. At each type of NE, the NE of type (t1, t2) that
maximizes the social welfare pis,(t1,t2), the pricing policy
Ps,(t1,t2) that induces pis,(t1,t2), and the corresponding social
welfare S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) can be determined either
analytically or by solving a convex program as in Table I.
To maximize the revenue, the selfish provider compares the
revenue achievable at nine types of NE. The procedure to
solve the selfish provider’s design problem under CSMA is
summarized in Table II.
Remark 1: To maximize the social welfare, the benevolent
provider needs to consider only six types of NE. In contrast, to
maximize the revenue, the selfish provider needs to consider
all nine types of NE. This is because for the three types of NE
in which no user is in, the social welfare is zero (no better
than not operating the network), but the revenue is positive
and is possibly larger than that at the other types of NE. In
addition, at the NE of the type (m,m), which can be neglected
by the benevolent provider, the selfish provider has to solve
the complicated nonconvex optimization problem in step 8 of
Table II. To solve this problem, the selfish provider has to
exhaustively search for the optimal subscription fee p(m,m)s .
In sum, the computational complexity for the selfish provider
to maximize the revenue is higher than that for the benevolent
provider to maximize the social welfare.
2) Comparison between the benevolent and selfish
providers: As seems obvious, the benevolent provider
charges as little as possible, subject to revenue being at least
as great as cost; the selfish provider charges as much as
possible, subject to the cost to each user being no greater
than utility. Due to the differences in the providers’ objectives
8TABLE I
PROCEDURE TO SOLVE THE BENEVOLENT PROVIDER’S DESIGN PROBLEM
UNDER CSMA.
Step 1. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (i, i), i.e., both types of users are in:
If mink=1,2
{
∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]}
· (N1 +N2) ≥ C0, then
pis,(i,i) = ([0, 1], [0, 1]), Ps,(i,i) =
(
φ,
(
p
s,(i,i)
s =
C0
N1+N2
, 0
))
,
S(θ, α,Ps,(i,i), pis,(i,i)) =
∑2
k=1 ∆T
Nk·λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
− C0;
otherwise, S(θ, α,Ps,(i,i), pis,(i,i)) = −∞.
Step 2-3. Solve for the case of tk = i, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are in, the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
If ∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1
]
≥ max
{
∆T
λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (xk(1))Nk
]
, C0
Nk
}
, then
pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
k = [0, 1], pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
−k = [1, 0],
Ps,(tk=i,t−k=o) =
(
φ,
(
p
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
s = max
{
∆T
λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (xk(1))Nk
]
, C0
Nk
}
, 0
))
,
S(θ, α,Ps,((tk=i,t−k=o)), pis,((tk=i,t−k=o))) =
{
∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1
]
− ps
}
·Nk;
otherwise, S(θ, α,Ps,((tk=i,t−k=o)), pis,((tk=i,t−k=o))) = −∞.
Step 4-5. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = i, i.e., type-k users are mixed, the other type of users are in (k = 1 or 2) :
pi
s,(tk=m,t−k=i)
k = [1− pik,1, pik,1], pi
s,(tk=m,t−k=i)
−k = [0, 1], where pik,1 is the solution to the following convex program:
S(θ, α,Ps,(tk=m,t−k=i), pis,(tk=m,t−k=i)) = max
pik,1∈[0,1]
∆T
λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (x−k(1))N−k−1(xk(pik,1))Nk
]
·N−k
−∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
·N−k
s.t. ∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
· (pik,1Nk +N−k) ≥ C0.
If S(θ, α,Ps,(tk=m,t−k=i), pis,(tk=m,t−k=i)) > −∞, then
Ps,(tk=m,t−k=i) =
(
φ,
(
p
s,(tk=m,t−k=i)
s = ∆T
λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
, 0
))
.
Step 6. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (o, o), i.e., both types of users are out:
pis,(o,o) = ([1, 0], [1, 0]), Ps,(o,o) =
(
φ,
(
p
s,(o,o)
s =∞, 0
))
, S(θ, α,Ps,(o,o), pis,(o,o)) = 0.
Step 7. Compare S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) at the above six types of NE and choose the optimal NE.
and charging schemes, there are ranges of the user number
and demand parameters for which the optimal type of NE
when the provider is benevolent and the optimal type when
the provider is selfish are different. As an illustration, we
show the optimal types of NE under different user number
and demand parameters when the provider is benevolent and
selfish in Fig. 3a–3d. The parameters in the simulation are as
follows:
• The provider uses a CSMA protocol with a constant
backoff window that is equivalent to a slotted ALOHA
protocol with transmission probability p = 2/17.
• The bandwidth is normalized to 1.
• α1 = 10, β1 = 0.3 for video users and α2 = 5, β2 = 0.1
for email users (same as in Fig. 2).
• The billing period is normalized to ∆T = 1.
• The cost of the service provider is C0 = 0.
Fig. 3a shows the case of low-demand video users and
low-demand email users. When both types of users have low
demands, there is a high probability that the number of online
users in the system is small. In other words, the congestion
level is low in most of the times. Hence, the utility of use of
one user will not decrease significantly with the addition of the
other type of users. For this reason, the benevolent provider
prefers the NE in which both types of users are in. This can
be done by setting a very low (zero in this case) subscription
such that both types can be in with positive net utilities. For
the selfish provider, its revenue at the NE in which both types
are in depends on the smaller one of the utilities of use of
the two types of users, namely the utility of use of an email
user in this case, and the total number of users. Since the
congestion level is always low, the utility of use of the video
users is much larger than that of the email users in most of
the times. Hence, in most cases, the selfish provider prefers
the NE in which only video users are in, because it can set a
subscription fee almost as high as the utility of use of a video
user. However, it will set a smaller subscription fee to let both
types in, when the number of email users is much larger than
that of the video users.
Fig. 3b shows the case of low-demand video users and high-
demand email users. Although the demand of email users is
high, the congestion level is still always low if the number
of email users is small. Hence, the benevolent provider sets
a low subscription fee to let both types in when the number
of email users is small. When the number of email users is
higher, the utility of use of video users decreases to below zero,
because they need high throughput to get a positive utility of
use. Hence, video users choose to be out when the number of
email users is high (around 25). When the number of data users
keeps growing, they has to be mixed to reduce the congestion
level. Since the video users are out and the data users are
mixed, the social welfare is zero, the same as in the case when
the provider does not setup the network. Since the utility of
use of video users is low even when the number of data users
is small, the selfish provider selects the NE in which both are
in only when the video users outnumber the email users. When
the number of data users is large, the utility of use of video
users is negative, and the selfish provider will choose the NE
9TABLE II
PROCEDURE TO SOLVE THE SELFISH PROVIDER’S DESIGN PROBLEM
UNDER CSMA.
Step 1. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (i, i), i.e., both types of users are in:
Define pr,(i,i)s , mink=1,2
{
∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]}
.
pir,(i,i) = ([0, 1], [0, 1]), Pr,(i,i) =
(
φ,
(
p
(i,i)
s , 0
))
, R(θ, α,Pr,(i,i), pir,(i,i)) =
 p
r,(i,i)
s · (N1 +N2) if pr,(i,i)s ≥ C0N1+N2
−∞ otherwise
.
Step 2-3. Solve for the case of tk = i, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are in, the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
If ∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1
]
≥ max
{
∆T
λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (xk(1))Nk
]
, C0
Nk
}
, then
pir,(tk=i,t−k=o) = ([0, 1], [1, 0]), p
r,(tk=i,t−k=o)
s = ∆T
λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(1))Nk−1
]
,
R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=i,t−k=o), pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) =
 p
r,(tk=i,t−k=o)
s ·Nk if pr,(tk=i,t−k=o)s ·Nk ≥ C0
−∞ otherwise
.
otherwise, R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=i,t−k=o), pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) = −∞.
Step 4-5. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = i, i.e., type-k users are mixed, the other type of users are in (k = 1 or 2) :
pi
r,(tk=m,t−k=i)
k = [1− pik,1, pik,1], pi
r,(tk=m,t−k=i)
−k = [0, 1], where pik,1 is the solution to the following convex program:
R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=m,t−k=i), pir,(tk=m,t−k=i)) =
max
pik,1∈[0,1]
∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
· (pik,1Nk +N−k)
s.t.
λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (x−k(1))N−k−1(xk(pik,1))Nk
]
≥ λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
,
∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
· (pik,1Nk +N−k) ≥ C0.
If R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=m,t−k=i), pir,(tk=m,t−k=i)) ≥ −∞, pr,(tk=m,t−k=i)s = ∆T λkλk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1(x−k(1))N−k
]
.
Step 6-7. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are mixed, the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
pi
r,(tk=m,t−k=o)
k = [1− pik,1, pik,1], pi
r,(tk=m,t−k=o)
−k = [1, 0], where pik,1 is the solution to the following convex program:
R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=m,t−k=o), pir,(tk=m,t−k=o)) = max
pik,1∈[0,1]
∆T
λk
λk + µk
[
αk −
βk
p
(xk(pik,1))
Nk−1
]
· pik,1Nk
s.t. ∆T λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1
]
· pik,1Nk ≥ C0,
λk
λk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1
]
≥ λ−k
λ−k+µ−k
[
α−k − β−kp (xk(pik,1))Nk
]
.
If R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=m,t−k=o), pir,(tk=m,t−k=o)) ≥ −∞, pr,(tk=m,t−k=o)s = ∆T λkλk+µk
[
αk − βkp (xk(pik,1))Nk−1
]
.
Step 8. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (m,m), i.e., both types of users are mixed:
p
(m,m)
s is the solution to the following optimization problem:
R(θ, α,Pr,(m,m), pir,(m,m)) = max
ps
ps · (pi1,1N1 + pi2,1N2)
s.t. 0 ≤ ps ≤ mink=1,2
{
∆T λk
λk+µk
(αk − βk/p)
}
,
pik,1 =

[(
α−k− ps∆T
λ−k+µ−k
λ−k
)
/
(
β−k
p
)] N−k
N1+N2−1
[(
αk− ps∆T
λk+µk
λk
)
/
(
βk
p
)] N−k−1
N1+N2−1
− 1
 · λk+µkλk · 1−pp , k = 1, 2,
0 ≤ pik,1 ≤ 1, k = 1, 2,
ps · (pi1,1N1 + pi2,1N2) ≥ C0.
If R(θ, α,Pr,(m,m), pir,(m,m)) ≥ −∞, pik,1 and pi−k,1 are calculated by the equality constraints in the above optimization problem.
Step 9. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (o, o), i.e., both types of users are out:
pir,(o,o) = ([1, 0], [1, 0]), Pr,(o,o) = (φ, (ps =∞, 0)) , R(θ, α,Pr,(o,o), pir,(o,o)) = 0.
Step 10. Compare R(θ, α,Pr,(t1,t2), pir,(t1,t2)) at the above nine types of NE and choose the optimal NE.
in which video users are out.
Fig. 3c shows the case of high-demand video users and
low-demand email users. This case is similar to the previous
one, except that the high-demand users are the video users
instead of the email users. Both providers choose the NE in
which both types are in when there are a small number of
high-demand video users. When the number of video users
grows, they choose the NE in which email users are out.
The difference between these two cases happens when the
number of high-demand users is very high and they choose
to be mixed. In this case, the low-demand email users can
still be in the network with positive utilities, because they do
not require high throughput to have positive utilities. On the
contrary, in the previous case, the low-demand video users
can not get positive utilities in the network even when the
high-demand email users choose to be mixed. It is worth
noticing that in the case of high-demand video users and low-
demand email users, in order to maximize the social welfare,
the benevolent provider may charge a positive subscription fee
even when the cost is zero. This happens when the number of
video users is around 20 and that of email users is around 5.
Intuitively, the benevolent provider should not charge to make
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Fig. 3. Phase diagrams of the optimal types of NE under CSMA. (a): low-demand λ1/µ1 = 0.1 video users (type-1) and low-demand λ2/µ2 = 0.1 email
users (type-2); (b): low-demand λ1/µ1 = 0.1 video users (type-1) and high-demand λ2/µ2 = 1 email users (type-2); (c): high-demand λ1/µ1 = 1 video
users (type-1) and low-demand λ2/µ2 = 0.1 email users (type-2); (d): high-demand λ1/µ1 = 1 video users (type-1) and high-demand λ2/µ2 = 1 email
users (type-2).
profit. However, it has to make profit to maximize the social
welfare in certain circumstances.
Fig. 3d shows the case of high-demand video users and
high-demand email users. In this case, the congestion level is
high as long as there is at least one type of users with a large
user number. Hence, both providers tend to choose the NE in
which only one type is in, except when both types have small
user numbers. Roughly speaking, they prefer the NE in which
the type of users with a smaller user number are in, such that
the utility of use of each online user is high.
Remark 2: As we have discussed in Remark 1, the selfish
provider needs to undertake high computational complexity
to determine the highest revenue achievable at the NE in
which both types are mixed. If the computational complexity
is beyond its limit, the selfish provider can neglect the NE of
the type (m,m) to get a suboptimal revenue. In a wide range
of user number and demand parameters shown in Fig. 3a–3d,
it will not cause any loss in the revenue by neglecting the
NE of the type (m,m). Moreover, the providers only need to
solve the design problems once before the network is setup
B. TDMA
The provider using TDMA offers the dummy pricing plan
p0 = φ and non-dummy pricing plans that charge subscription
fees and per-bit rates p = (ps, q). Again, we use backward
induction to analyze the design problem of the provider.
The benevolent (selfish) provider compares the social welfare
(revenue) at all the possible equilibria of the plan selection
game and chooses the NE with the highest social welfare
(revenue). We first prove that it is sufficient to consider the
pricing policies that consist of a dummy pricing plan and one
non-dummy pricing plan.
Proposition 2: Suppose that the benevolent service provider
uses θ = TDMA, has no admission control (α ≡ 1), and offers
the pricing policy P′. For any NE pi of the plan selection
game GP′ , we can find a pricing policy P = (φ, (ps, q)),
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TABLE III
PROCEDURE TO SOLVE THE BENEVOLENT PROVIDER’S DESIGN PROBLEM
UNDER TDMA.
Step 1. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (i, i), i.e., both types of users
are in:
Define pis,(i,i) = ([0, 1], [0, 1]), k = min
m=1,2
Um(θ, α, pi
s,(i,i)), and
ρ = min
{
U−k(θ,α,pis,(i,i))
Uk(θ,α,pi
s,(i,i))
,max
{
1,
B−k(θ,α,pis,(i,i))
Bk(θ,α,pi
s,(i,i))
}}
.
If Uk(θ, α, pis,(i,i)) · (Nk + ρ ·N−k) ≥ C0, then
p
s,(i,i)
s =
C0
ρ·N−k+Nk
1− ρ−1
B−k(θ,α,pis,(i,i))
Bk(θ,α,pi
s,(i,i))
−1
 ,
qs,(i,i) = C0
ρ·N−k+Nk ·
ρ−1
B−k(θ,α,pis,(i,i))−Bk(θ,α,pis,(i,i))
,
S(θ, α,Ps,(i,i), pis,(i,i)) =
∑2
k=1 Uk(θ, α, pi
s,(i,i)) ·Nk − C0;
otherwise, S(θ, α,Ps,(i,i), pis,(i,i)) = −∞.
Step 2-3. Solve for the case of tk = i, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are in,
the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
Define pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
k = [0, 1], pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
−k = [1, 0], and ρ =
max
{
C0/Nk
U−k(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))
,min
{
1,
Bk(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))
B−k(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))
}}
If Uk(θ, α, pis,(tk=i,t−k=o)) ≥ ρ · U−k(θ, α, pis,(tk=i,t−k=o)), then
p
s,(tk=i,t−k=o)
s = U−k(θ, α, pis,(tk=i,t−k=o))
·
1− 1−min{1,ρ}
1− Bk(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))
B−k(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))
 ,
qs,(tk=i,t−k=o)
= U−k(θ, α, pis,(tk=i,t−k=o))
· 1−min{1,ρ}
B−k(θ,α,pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))−Bk(θ,α,pis,(tk=i,t−k=o))
,
S(θ, α,Ps,(tk=i,t−k=o), pis,(tk=i,t−k=o))
=
(
Uk(θ, α, pi
s,(tk=i,t−k=o))− ρ · U−k(θ, α, pis,(tk=i,t−k=o))
)
· Nk
otherwise, S(θ, α,Ps,(tk=i,t−k=o), pis,(tk=i,t−k=o)) = −∞.
Step 4-5. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = i, i.e., type-k users are
mixed, the other type of users are in (k = 1 or 2) :
Exhaustively search for pik,1 in pis,(tk=m,t−k=i).
Step 6. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (o, o), i.e., both types of users
are out:
pis,(o,o) = ([1, 0], [1, 0]), p
s,(o,o)
s =∞, qs,(o,o) = 0,
S(θ, α,Ps,(o,o), pis,(o,o)) = 0.
Step 7. Compare S(θ, α,Ps,(t1,t2), pis,(t1,t2)) at the above six types
of NE and choose the optimal NE.
such that pi is a NE of the plan selection game GP and that
Ck(θ, α,P, pi) = Ck(θ, α,P
′, pi) for k = 1, 2.
Proof: See [26, Appendix C].
Proposition 2 allows the providers to offer a simple pricing
policy P = (φ, (ps, q)) that consists of a dummy pricing plan
and a single non-dummy pricing plan, without sacrificing the
social welfare or the revenue. It also simplifies our following
analysis. Similar to the case of CSMA, there are nine types of
NE in the plan selection game, depending on whether a type
of users are in, out, or mixed. Hence, we can use the same
superscript (t1, t2) to denote the type of NE.
Before solving the design problems, we derive the analytical
expressions of the expected utility of use and the expected cost
as follows.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the service provider uses θ =
TDMA, has no admission control (α ≡ 1), and offers the
pricing policy P =
(
p0 = φ,p1 = (ps, q)
)
. When the other
users choose actions according to the action profile pi, the
expected utility of use and expected cost of a type-k user,
whose action is pi′k, are
Uk(θ, α, (pi;pi
′
k)) = pi
′
k,1 ·∆T
λk
λk + µk
· (13)[
αk − βk
(
1 +
λk(Nk − 1)
λk + µk
pik,1 +
λ−kN−k
λ−k + µ−k
pi−k,1
)]
and
Ck(θ, α,P, (pi;pi
′
k)) = pi
′
k,1 ·
(
ps + q · Bˆk(θ, α, pi)
)
, (14)
where Bˆk(θ, α, pi) is the expected data usage of an online
type-k user calculated as
Bˆk(θ, α, pi) =
Nk∑
nk,1=1
N−k∑
n−k,1=0
(
Nk − 1
nk,1 − 1
)
· pink,1−1k,1 (1− pik,1)Nk−nk,1
·
(
N−k
n−k,1
)
· pin−k,1−k,1 (1− pi−k,1)N−k−n−k,1 ·B1k(θ, α,n), (15)
where B1k(θ, α,n) is calculated in (4) with τ
θ
k,1(x) =
1
xk,1+x−k,1
.
Proof: See [26, Appendix D].
1) Procedures to solve the design problems under TDMA:
Suppose that the service provider uses θ = TDMA, has no
admission control (α ≡ 1), and offers the pricing policy P =
(φ, (ps, q)). To maximize the social welfare, the benevolent
provider follows the procedure shown in Table III. It compares
the social welfare achievable at six types of NE, and then
chooses the optimal NE. Likewise, to maximize the revenue,
the selfish provider compares the revenue achievable at nine
types of NE. The procedure to solve the selfish provider’s
design problem under TDMA is summarized in Table IV.
Remark 3: Using TDMA enables the provider to charge
users for the guaranteed data rates, which results in higher
social welfare or revenue. However, as we can see from
Table III and Table IV, the provider has to perform exhaustive
search for the highest social welfare or revenue achievable at
certain types of NE, due to the complicated expression for
the expected data rate (15). More specifically, the provider
can analytically solve the cases of the four types of NE with
no user being mixed, but needs exhaustive search for the
cases of the five types of NE in which at least one type of
users are mixed. Hence, to achieve optimal performance, the
provider using TDMA has a higher computational complexity
than the one using CSMA. However, the additional complexity
is acceptable, because the provider solves the design problem
only once prior to the setup of the network.
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TABLE IV
PROCEDURE TO SOLVE THE SELFISH PROVIDER’S DESIGN PROBLEM
UNDER TDMA.
Step 1. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (i, i), i.e., both types of users are in:
Define pir,(i,i) = ([0, 1], [0, 1]), k = min
m=1,2
Um(θ, α, pi
r,(i,i)), and
ρ = min
{
U−k(θ,α,pir,(i,i))
Uk(θ,α,pi
r,(i,i))
,max
{
1,
B−k(θ,α,pir,(i,i))
Bk(θ,α,pi
r,(i,i))
}}
.
If Uk(θ, α, pir,(i,i)) · (Nk + ρ ·N−k) ≥ C0, then
p
r,(i,i)
s = Uk(θ, α, pi
r,(i,i))
1− ρ−1
B−k(θ,α,pir,(i,i))
Bk(θ,α,pi
r,(i,i))
−1
 , qr,(i,i) = Uk(θ, α, pir,(i,i)) · ρ−1B−k(θ,α,pir,(i,i))−Bk(θ,α,pir,(i,i)) ,
R(θ, α,Pr,(i,i), pir,(i,i)) = Uk(θ, α, pi
r,(i,i)) · (Nk + ρ ·N−k)
otherwise, R(θ, α,Pr,(i,i), pir,(i,i)) = −∞.
Step 2-3. Solve for the case of tk = i, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are in, the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
Define pi
r,(tk=i,t−k=o)
k = [0, 1], pi
r,(tk=i,t−k=o)
−k = [1, 0], and
If Uk(θ, α, pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) ≥ ρ · U−k(θ, α, pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)), then
p
r,(tk=i,t−k=o)
s = U−k(θ, α, pir,(tk=i,t−k=o))
ρ− 1−min{1,ρ}B−k(θ,α,pir,(tk=i,t−k=o))
Bk(θ,α,pi
r,(tk=i,t−k=o))
−1
 ,
qr,(tk=i,t−k=o) = U−k(θ, α, pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) · 1−min{1,ρ}
B−k(θ,α,pi
r,(tk=i,t−k=o))−Bk(θ,α,pir,(tk=i,t−k=o))
,
R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=i,t−k=o), pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) = ρ · U−k(θ, α, pir,(tk=i,t−k=o))) ·Nk;
otherwise, R(θ, α,Pr,(tk=i,t−k=o), pir,(tk=i,t−k=o)) = −∞.
Step 4-5. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = i, i.e., type-k users are mixed, the other type of users are in (k = 1 or 2) :
Exhaustively search for pik,1 in pir,(tk=m,t−k=i).
Step 6-7. Solve for the case of tk = m, t−k = o, i.e., type-k users are mixed, the other type of users are out (k = 1 or 2) :
Exhaustively search for pik,1 in pir,(tk=m,t−k=o).
Step 8. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (m,m), i.e., both types of users are mixed:
Exhaustively search for pik,1 and pi−k,1 in pir,(m,m).
Step 9. Solve for the case of (t1, t2) = (o, o), i.e., both types of users are out:
pir,(o,o) = ([1, 0], [1, 0]), p
r,(o,o)
s =∞, qr,(o,o) = 0, S(θ, α,Pr,(o,o), pir,(o,o)) = 0.
Step 10. Compare R(θ, α,Pr,(t1,t2), pir,(t1,t2)) at the above nine types of NE and choose the optimal NE.
2) Comparison between CSMA and TDMA: We illustrate
the solutions to the design problems when the providers use
TDMA. Since the providers’ objectives do not change in
TDMA, the difference in the behaviors of the benevolent
provider and the selfish provider is similar to the case when
they use CSMA, which has been discussed in the previous
subsection. Hence, the focus here is the comparison between
CSMA and TDMA in terms of the solutions to the design
problems and the resulting social welfare and revenue.
First, we show the phase diagram of the optimal types of
NE with high-demand video and email users under TDMA
in Fig. 4. The parameters in the simulation are the same
as those in the previous subsection. Compared to the phase
diagram under CSMA in Fig. 3d, we can see that for both the
benevolent and selfish providers, it is more likely that they
choose the pricing policies such that both types are in the
network, and is less likely that they choose the pricing policies
such that one type are out of the network. This is because
under the same number of users, the congestion under TDMA
is smaller than that under CSMA. The difference between
the congestion under TDMA and that under CSMA is large
especially when the number of users is large, as can be seen
from the expressions of the utility of use in (12) of Lemma 1
and (13) of Lemma 2: the utility of use under CSMA decreases
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Fig. 4. Phase diagrams of the optimal types of NE with high-demand
λ1/µ1 = 1 video users (type-1) and high-demand λ2/µ2 = 1 email users
(type-2) under TDMA.
exponentially with the number of users, while the utility of use
under TDMA decreases linearly with the number of users.
Since the congestion under TDMA is smaller, the providers
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demand λ1/µ1 = 1 video users (type-1) and high-demand λ2/µ2 = 1 email
users (type-2) under CSMA and TDMA. The number of video users is 10,
and the number of email users grows from 1 to 50.
can obtain high social welfare and revenue at the NE in which
both types are in the network. Note that in Fig. 4, we assume
that the cost is zero, which is the same as the cost of using
CSMA. However, it is more reasonable to assume that the
cost of using TDMA is higher than that of using CSMA. In
the following, we compare the social welfare and the revenue
when using TDMA and CSMA under different user number
and demand parameters, considering the cost difference of
TDMA and CSMA.
Fig. 5 shows the optimal social welfare achieved by the
benevolent provider under CSMA and TDMA. We can see that
when the cost difference is low (C0 = 1 for CSMA and C0 =
2 for TDMA), TDMA is always better in the range of email
user number parameters considered. When the cost difference
is high (C0 = 15 for CSMA and C0 = 30 for TDMA), TDMA
is worse initially, when it does not cover the cost to have
both types in the network due to the small number of email
users. Similarly, as shown in Fig. 6, the profit achieved by
the selfish provider under TDMA is always better when the
cost difference is low, and that achieved under TDMA could
be worse when the cost difference is high and the number of
email users is small. The providers can also draw such figures
under different user number and demand parameters and under
different costs for CSMA and TDMA, in order to predetermine
which MAC protocol to adopt.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the provision of a wireless network
by a monopolistic provider who may be either benevolent
(seeking to maximize social welfare) or selfish (seeking to
maximize revenue). The paper presented a model for the public
wireless network with three interdependent layers, namely
the technology layer, the application layer, and the economic
layer. Using the proposed model, we analyzed the influence
of technology on the economic layer, and more importantly,
the interaction of technology and economic layers that de-
termines the feasibility and desirability of the network. We
derived the social welfare (the revenue) and the corresponding
optimal pricing policy at the optimal operating points of the
benevolent (selfish) service providers for the wireless network
under different technologies. By simulation, we characterized
different behaviors of a benevolent provider and a selfish
provider at their optimal operating points, and the difference
social welfare and revenue resulting from the different behav-
iors. Simulation results also demonstrated that differences in
MAC technology can have a significant effect on the system
performance. By using TDMA, which enables the providers
to charge per-bit rate, both the benevolent provider and the
selfish provider can exploit the flexibility of differentiated
pricing plans in order to maximize social welfare and revenue,
respectively.
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